This paper analyzes the role of corporate pensions in firms' financial distress. We find firms with defined benefit (DB) pension plans reduce these plans' exposures to company stock prior to defaults, avoiding losses from declining stock prices. These firms also lower their contributions to DB plans significantly prior to defaults, increasing underfunding. Reduced company stock exposures and greater underfunding are strongly related to default probabilities. In contrast, neither the company stock exposures nor underfunding of DB plans is a significant determinant of the restructuring type (bankruptcies versus out of court restructurings). In contrast, exposures to company stock in defined contribution (DC) plans exhibit little variation over time prior to firms' defaults. We calculate that employees incur an average loss of $18 million per firm over the three years before default from their exposures to company stock. Further, company stock exposures in DC plans significantly increase a firm's probability of defaulting and filing for bankruptcy (instead of restructuring out of court), suggesting a link between employee-ownership-related managerial entrenchment and increased default risk.
Introduction
When firms become financially distressed, their deteriorating financial conditions impose significant costs on employees. In addition to reduced job security, employees are also exposed to potential financial losses through their pensions. 1 The existence of such losses has been repeatedly noticed by industry sources, with extensive discussions on the key factors driving these losses for defined benefit (DB) and/or defined contribution (DC) pension plans. Despite such attention, no study has systematically documented the role of corporate pensions in firms' financial distress. This paper seeks to fill this gap.
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For firms with DB plans, anecdotal evidence emphasizes the importance of pension underfunding in bankruptcy cases. For example, the corporate turnaround expert Robert "Steve"
Miller attributed the difficulties experienced by many firms in Chapter 11 in the distress resolution process to pension underfunding (TIME, October 17, 2005) . Underfunding of DB plans can stem from reduced employer contributions and/or unwise investment decisions of the plans. In the latter case, given the ERISA requirements of prudence and diversification for corporate pension funds, the bad investment outcome may be driven by plans' holdings of company stock, which typically suffers large losses when the firm approaches default. 3 Moreover, the employee ownership of company stock through pension plans may influence firms' default probabilities and financial conditions, which we will discuss in detail below, and these influences may further affect pension underfunding.
1 For example, participants in defined benefit (DB) plans often lose a large fraction of benefits if the firm terminates its plans because the PBGC coverage is often much lower than the benefits they were entitled to in the plans (e.g., UAL and Delphi Corp). Participants in defined contribution (DC) plans can incur large losses from retirement assets invested in company stock when the firm becomes financially distressed (e.g., Enron and WorldCom). 2 Prior literature on financial distress focuses on effects on management (See Hotchkiss, John, Mooradian, and Thorburn (2008) for a review) and no study has analyzed the effects on employees.
posits that employees with higher pension exposures to company stocks have stronger incentives to reduce the value loss through increased support for the distressed firm (such as higher human capital investment and temporary pay cuts). Thus, these firms are expected to manage through the process of resolving financial distress more efficiently.
Alternatively, management may encourage employee ownership in pension plans to entrench themselves. There is some evidence that employees prefer company stock to other investments in pension plans, possibly driven by behavioral traits. 6 Jensen and Meckling (1976) list strong relations between management and employees as a non-pecuniary benefit enjoyed by managers, which have led to management-employee allies in many proxy contests (e.g., Stulz, 1988; Pagano and Volpin, 2005) . Besides management-employee bonding, since employees are interested in job retention, they are more likely to side with the incumbent management in proxy contests. Thus, employee ownership in pensions can serve as an effective takeover defense (Rauh, 2006) . Under this entrenchment view, firms with higher exposures to company stock in pension plans are expected to have more agency problems and enjoy less operational efficiency, implying a higher likelihood and severity of financial distress. Moreover, once distressed, these firms are expected to encounter more agency issues in the restructuring process, leading to lower efficiency in distress resolution.
Because the motivational and entrenchment views have opposite predictions, the influences of pensions' company stock ownership on the likelihood and resolution process of financial distress become an empirical question. We explore this issue in our analyses for both firms with DB plans and those with DC plans. 6 For example, the executive VP and DC practice leader of Callan Associates Inc., Lori Lucas, noted that "when a company's stock goes up, employees don't want to diversify, and when it goes down, employees think the stock is a bargain. When one company's stock 'blows up,' taking participants' retirement assets with it, …, employees in other companies don't think the same thing could happen to them…" (July 12 th , 2010, Pension & Investment) . Benartzi (2001) shows that employees excessively extrapolate past performance of company stock in DC plan investment.
To conduct our analyses, we identify 597 defaults from 1992 to 2009 in Moody's Default Risk Service database, with 216 defaults involving firms with DB plans and 501 defaults involving firms with DC plans. For firms with DB plans, we document a sharp decrease in these plans' exposures to company stock prior to defaults, which is likely to be driven by the firms' desires to avoid plan losses from declining stock prices. These firms also significantly lower their contributions to DB plans when approaching default, while the level and percentage of underfunding for these plans experience large increases.
When we analyze the effects of underfunding and exposures to company stock in DB plans on a firm's default probability using a default prediction model similar to Shumway (2001), we find increasing underfunding positively predicts defaults, whereas company stock exposures reduce default probabilities. Further, firms with higher company stock exposures three years ago and underfunded pensions in the current year have higher default probabilities than other firms, suggesting a combined effect of these two factors on default risk, although the evidence is relatively weak. Firms may want to file for bankruptcy rather than restructure out of court if they benefit by shifting pension obligations to PBGC. In contrast with pension underfunding and company stock exposures' strong influences on default probabilities, we find no evidence that either one of them is a strong determinant for the restructuring types (bankruptcies versus out of court restructurings) of defaulting firms. Thus, our findings cast doubts on the argument that defaulting firms often opt for bankruptcies to terminate underfunded pensions, a practice not allowed in out of court restructurings.
Because underfunding is not relevant for DC plans, we focus on these plans' exposures to company stock in all analyses involving firms with DC plans. We find these exposures exhibit little variations in the years prior to firms' defaults, while stock prices decline sharply in the meantime. As a result, firms' employees suffer from an average loss of $18 million per firm during the three years before default because of the failure to reduce company stock exposures in pensions. In addition, contributions to DC plans by both employees and sponsor firms are very stables in the years prior to defaults, indicating that neither party proactively reduces the employees' exposures to an investment strategy under-diversified in an asset with expected losses (i.e., company stock). These findings are consistent with DC plan participants' asset allocation inertia documented by Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden (2003) .
Using a default prediction model similar to Shumway (2001), we find company stock exposures in DC plans strongly predict firms' defaults. Further, company stock exposures are also positively related to bankruptcy filings (instead of out of court restructurings), indicating an increased severity of financial distress among defaulting firms with higher company stock exposures. These findings are consistent with the entrenchment view of employee ownership, suggesting an association between employee-ownership-related managerial entrenchment and increased default risk.
Our paper is the first in the literature to document the exposures of firms' employees to losses in the event of distress via their pension holdings as well as documenting the outcomes for pension plan participants in a large sample of firms that fail. Our findings also complement and extend the analyses of Rauh (2009) on the relationship between DB plan underfunding and firms' bankruptcy probabilities.
7 Because his bankruptcy sample is small (with only 16 bankruptcies), Rauh (2009) does not find conclusive evidence on this relationship, which we identify using a significantly larger sample of defaults. Further, our paper sheds lights on whether and how company stock exposures in DB plans affect their underfunding and the combined influences of 7 Our paper is also related to Benmelech et al. (2011) , who document an increased likelihood for bankrupted airlines to obtain wage concessions from employees when their DB plans are underfunded.
these two factors on default probabilities. Finally, we provide direct evidence to policy makers on the benefits and costs of regulating DB plan underfunding and company stock ownership in DC plans (such as imposing an upper limit).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data used in our analyses and presents summary statistics for the key default and pension variables. Section 3 examines the effects of corporate pensions on firms' default probabilities. Section 4 analyzes the role of corporate pensions in defaulting firms' choices of restructuring types. Section 5 concludes.
Data

Sample description
We identify defaults using Moody' 
Descriptive statistics
In this section, we provide descriptive statistics for the key financial and pension variables for firms in our default sample.
( Firms with pension information are considerably larger than those without pension information.
The average assets for the former group (column 2) are $5,491 million and it is only slightly more than one third of that at $1990.4 million for the latter group. Statistics for sales and the number of employees follow similar patterns.
In Panel B of In column 3, the median percentage of underfunding for defaulting firms with DB plans increases over time, indicating the difficulty these firms experience in funding their pensions when approaching financial distress. 11 In year -5, the median underfunding percentage is -2.9%
(i.e., the plans are overfunded by 2.9%), whereas it is 9.3% in year -1. Column 4 presents the fraction of firms with underfunded pensions at each of year -5 to -1 prior to defaults, and we observe an increasing fraction of underfunded firms over time. By the year before default, pension plans become underfunded for about two thirds of the defaulting firms. We are also interested in the fraction of firms with deep pension underfunding: i.e., those with underfunding accounting for more than 10% of plan assets (column 5), and find a similar increasing pattern to that in column 4. Firms must increase contribution to pensions if a plan is funded below 90% of current liabilities for three consecutive years or below 80% in any year. Thus, the growing fraction of firms with deep underfunding further illustrates the pressures firms face from the funding requirements of their pensions when approaching defaults.
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In the next four columns of Panel A, we restrict the sample to firms with underfunded pensions and present the mean and median amounts and percentage of underfunding for them in the five years prior to defaults. We note an increasing pattern in underfunding in these columns.
For example, in year -5 and -4, the mean underfunding is $75.8 and $73.8 million, respectively, while they increase to $110.9 and $108.0 million in year -2 and -1. These underfunding levels represent the additional amounts firms need to contribute to the pension plans in order to fulfill their obligations to active and retired employees, and hence the magnitude of obligations firms can reduce in cases of distress terminations of pension plans.
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Columns 10-14 of Panel A present summary statistics for the defaulting firms' exposures to company stock in their DB plans. Only a small fraction of these firms (ranging from 1.5% to 6.9% in the five years prior to defaults) have such exposures and this fraction decreases over time, as illustrated by column 10. In the next four columns, we restrict the sample to firms with company stock exposures in pensions and examine their levels of exposures, which we find to be very low as well. When we measure the level of exposures as the fraction of the total number of shares outstanding of firms owned by DB plans, the median exposure never exceeds 0.5% in year -5 to -1 and goes down to 0.2% in year -1. A similar pattern can be found when we measure the pensions' exposures to company stock as the ratio of company stock value in plans over total plan assets. Combined with a decreasing fraction of firms having such exposures (column 10), statistics in these four columns suggest that firms reduce their pensions' exposures to company stock when approaching financial distress, which allows them to avoid the potential losses from declining stock prices.
14 Finally, column 15 of Panel A presents the mean values of firms' contributions to DB plans in the five years prior to defaults. The contribution level is stable at about $12-$13 million in the first four years and drops to $4.5 million in the last year before defaults. In sum, firms significantly reduce contributions to DB plans when financial distress is immediate, possibly caused by cash flow constraints.
Defaulting firms with defined contribution (DC) pension plans
In this section, we focus on the company stock exposures of DC plans among defaulting firms and present summary statistics of their key pension characteristics in Panel B of Table 2 .
Unlike DB plans, sponsors of DC plans are not committed to fixed levels of benefits for their employees upon retirements and often can choose whether and how much to match the contributions of employees. Hence, the underfunding problem is of little relevance for DC plans.
On the other hand, there is no mandatory limit on how much of DC plans' asset can be invested in company stock, and employee ownership through DC plans is often encouraged by firm management (as discussed in Section 1).
The first column in Panel B provides the number of firms with non-missing pension information in each of the five years prior to the 501 defaults involving firms with DC plans in our sample. In column 2, we present the fraction of firms with company stock exposures and find it to be stable at about 24% in the five years prior to defaults. In the next four columns, we restrict the sample to firms with company stock exposures in pensions and examine their levels of exposures. Columns 3 and 4 measure exposure level by dividing the number of shares owned by DC plans by the total number of shares outstanding of the firm, while columns 5 and 6 measure it by dividing the value of company stock in DC plans by total plan assets. When using the first measure, the mean exposure level among defaulting firms is stable at about 2% throughout year -5 to -1. In contrast, we find the mean exposure level drops significantly over time when using the second measure: it is 22.4% in year -5 but only 11.9% in year -1. These findings indicate that while the number of shares owned by DC plans does not vary significantly over time, their value decreases sharply as the firms approach financial distress. In untabulated analyses, we find that the average value of company stock in DC plans is $20.4 million in year -3 for defaulting firms with company stock exposures (in year -3), and if they continue to hold these stocks till the default dates (as suggested by columns 2-6), their value decreases by $18 million to $2.4 million. To summarize, DC plan sponsors and participants do not actively adjust these plans' exposures to company stock prior to defaults, and such inertia imposes significant losses on plan participants because of the value loss of company stock.
Columns 7 and 8 of Panel B report the average contributions to DC plans of defaulting firms made by the sponsor firms and employees, respectively. On average, firms contribute $4.3 million each year and employees contribute $12.8 million, with both groups' contributions appear to be stable over time. These findings are consistent with the contractual nature of employer-matching of employee contributions in DC plans and the investment inertia of DC plan participants discussed in Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden (2003) and Madrian and Shea (2001) . In other words, despite the deteriorating stock performance of firms approaching financial distress, DC plan participants continue to contribute a fixed fraction of income to the plans with large exposures to company stock (i.e., an investment strategy with expected losses).
Default Probabilities
Firms with defined benefit (DB) pension plans
In examining the determinants of default probabilities among firms with DB plans, we focus on two factors: the first is the pensions' exposures to company stock, and the second is pension underfunding. If employee ownership through pension plans has a motivational effect on employees, we expect such exposure to reduce the likelihood of financial distress. In contrast, if the exposures are motivated by the management's desires to secure employee support (which can be used as an entrenchment mechanism), such entrenchment may be associated with higher default probabilities. Pension underfunding is expected to increase the firms' default probabilities because it represents a cash flow obligation in the near future, which imposes direct pressures on financially constrained firms. We are also interested in the interaction between company stock exposures and pension underfunding and their combined effects on default probabilities because the declining stock performance of financially constrained firms may exacerbate the underfunding problem through pension exposures to company stock, which may further increases default probabilities.
To test the impacts of the above two factors on default probabilities, we estimate a discrete time hazard model using the methodology of Shumway (2001). This approach is similar to a panel logit model, and permits our covariates explaining defaults to be time varying. The dependent variable equals to one if the firm defaults in a given year and zero otherwise. We construct a dummy variable D uf to indicate firms with underfunded DB plans in a given year. We also interact this dummy variable with the level of underfunding (denoted by underfunding) and the percentage of underfunding (denoted by PCT uf ) in a given year, whose constructions are described in Section 2.2.1. These interaction terms allow us to explore the effects of the level and percentage of pension underfunding on default probabilities.
In default prediction models it is obviously important to control for firm financial performance. Thus, we include annual sale growth and change in EBITDA/Sales as controls. We also control for differences in leverage, measured by total liabilities divided by total assets, as well as past stock performance, measured by cumulative stock returns in the past twelve months.
To include as many observations as possible, when any of the control variables is missing, we replace them with industry median values of the same year, where industry is measured by 2-digit SIC codes, or returns on S&P 500 index if past stock returns are missing. Year dummies are also included to control for changing macroeconomic conditions over time.
( Table 3 about Here)
The hazard model estimates are shown in Table 3 . The first specification indicates that firms with underfunded DB plans have significantly higher default probabilities compared to firms with fully-or over-funded pensions. This finding is consistent with the prediction that the liabilities of funding DB plans increase firms' likelihood to default. Among control variables, decreasing EBITDA/sales changes, increasing leverage, and declining stock performance are significant predictors of defaults, as would be expected. In contrast, we find no evidence that sales growth affects the likelihood of defaults, even if we do not include some other control variables such as leverage (un-tabulated).
In the specification in column 2, in addition to the underfunding dummy, we also include its interaction with the level of underfunding (D uf ×underfunding) in independent variables.
However, the coefficient on this interaction term is not significant, suggesting that the actual level of underfunding has little impact on default probabilities. The regression in column 3 includes the interaction term between the underfunding dummy and the percentage of underfunding (D uf ×PCTuf) in independent variables. The coefficient on this interaction term is not significant either, suggesting that the percentage of underfunding has little impact on default probabilities as well.
The specification in column 4 examines the effects of company stock exposures in DB plans on firms' default probabilities. Specifically, we add the level of this exposure, measured by the fraction of the firm's shares outstanding owned by its DB plans in year -3 (EMPO -3 ), to the independent variables of the above hazard model. We choose to use the company stock exposure levels in year -3 instead of on the last reporting dates before defaults because results in Panel A
of Table 2 show that most defaulting firms with past DB plan exposures to company stock eliminate such exposures shortly before defaults. Since only a small fraction of firms with DB plans have pension exposures to company stock, we also include a dummy indicating positive exposures in year -3 (D emp -3 ) in the independent variables to account for the possibility that some unobservable firm characteristics drive the existence and levels of such exposures. We find a negative and significant coefficient on EMPO -3 , suggesting that higher company stock exposures in DB plans are associated with lower default probabilities in the future.
Finally, the specification in column 4 also includes an interaction term between the underfunding dummy (D uf ) and the level of company stock exposures in DB plans in year -3 (EMPO -3 ) in independent variables, and we find a positive and weakly significant coefficient on it. This interaction term represents the combined and codetermined effects of company stock exposures and pension underfunding, and our finding suggests that pension exposures to company stock might exacerbate the underfunding problem leading to defaults, although the effects are fairly weak. Combined with our previous findings that higher company stock exposures are in general associated with lower default probabilities (as suggested by the coefficient on EMPO -3 ), and the low exposure levels among firms with DB plans in Panel A of Table 2 , we conclude that company stock exposures in DB plans are not a key factor leading to pension underfunding, which significantly increases default probabilities.
To summarize, we find a higher incidence of defaults among firms with underfunded DB plans, although the actual level and percentage of underfunding do not significantly affect default probabilities. Further, firms with higher company stock exposures in DB plans have lower likelihood to default. Although company stock exposures in DB plans may exacerbate the pension underfunding problem due to declining stock prices (and hence lead to defaults), firms have little such exposures and proactively sell the company stock when approaching defaults.
Therefore, the strong association between pension underfunding and firms' default probabilities is unlikely to be driven by DB plans' exposures to company stock.
Firms with defined contribution (DC) pension plans
In exploring the determinants of default probabilities among firms with DC plans, we focus on the plans' exposures to company stock, measured by the fraction of the firm's shares outstanding owned by its DC plans (EMPO). Specifically, we examine whether EMPO is a significant predictor for defaults in the hazard model described in Section 3.1, controlling for the financial and stock performance variables in Table 3 . Results of this regression are reported in column 1 of Table 4 .
( Table 4 about Here)
Results in column 1 indicate that increasing company stock exposures in DC plans are associated with higher default probabilities: the coefficient on EMPO is positive and significant at the 1% level. We also construct two additional measures of company stock exposures. The first is denoted by EMPO1, which take the value of EMPO if it is greater than 1% and zero otherwise. The second is denoted by EMPO5, which take the value of EMPO if it is greater than 5% and zero otherwise. These two variables, when included in our hazard model, allow us to test whether the positive relation between company stock exposures in DC plans and default probabilities in column 1 continues to hold when these exposures become large, in which case employee ownership through DC plans can play a significant role in corporate decisions (and hence the effects of the motivational and entrenchment view discussed in Section 1 are expected to be strong). The positive and significant coefficients on EMPO1 and EMPO5 in columns 2 and 3 show that this is indeed the case. Overall, our results in Table 4 suggest that increasing company stock exposures in DC plans lead to greater default probabilities, which is consistent with the entrenchment view of employee stock ownership through pension plans discussed in Section 1.
Restructurings of Defaults
In addition to the initial default date, Moody's DRS database also contains information about whether the firm resolved its distress out of court or through a bankruptcy filing, the bankruptcy filing date in cases that a court filing occurs, whether the bankruptcy filing was "prepackaged," and the resolution date of the restructuring. Using the above information, we classify defaults into four categories based on their restructuring type: distressed exchange, other out of court restructuring, prepackaged or prearranged Chapter 11 filing, or other Chapter 11 filing. 15 In addition, we pool the defaults involving distressed exchanges and other out of court restructurings and classify them as out of court restructurings, and pool defaults involving prepackaged or prearranged Chapter 11 and other Chapter 11 and classify them as bankruptcies.
Descriptive statistics
Panels A and B of Table 5 present summary statistics of the financial characteristics for the firms involved in the 460 bankruptcies in our default sample over time, among which we are able to locate pension information in the IRS 5500 database for 396 bankruptcies. The distribution of these bankruptcies is similar to that of the full default sample (Table 1) , and we therefore omit discussing this panel for brevity. We omit reporting these statistics for firms restructuring out of court because of their similarity to those for the bankruptcy sample, but they are available to interested readers upon request.
( Table 5 about Here) Panels C and D (E and F) provide summary statistics of the key pension variables (described in Section 2) for firms with DB (DC) plans that file for bankruptcies or restructure out of court. These summary statistics are again similar to those for the complete default sample (Table 2) , and we omit discussing them as well.
( Table 6 about Here) Table 6 shows the restructuring types for the 597 defaults in our default sample. We first note that the distribution of restructuring types is very similar for firms with and without pension information in the IRS 5500 database. On average, about 77% of default observations are
Chapter 11 bankruptcies and about 27% are out of court restructurings. Among bankruptcies, we distinguish between pre-packaged Chapter 11 bankruptcies (13% of defaults) and other Chapter 11 filings (64% of defaults). Out of court restructurings that are unsuccessful and subsequently file for Chapter 11 are characterized as bankruptcies. Among the out of court restructurings, distressed exchanges are the most common (14%-15% of defaults), while other out of court workouts are relatively rare (9% of defaults). 16 In unreported analyses, we identify the distress terminations of DB plans and find for 46 out of the 173 DB-related bankruptcies in our sample, PBGC subsequently replaced the sponsor firms as plan trustees. We explore whether pension underfunding indeed causes firms with DB plans to favor bankruptcies in restructurings or not in the next section.
Multivariate analysis
Defaulting firms with defined benefit (DB) pension plans
Although the summaries statistics of pension variables for bankrupted firms and those in out of court restructurings in Table 5 are informative about how underfunding and company stock exposures in DB plans affect firms' likelihood to file for bankruptcies, they do not control for other differences in firm characteristics, many of which were shown to be significant in Tables 3 and 4 .
In Table 7 , we test how pension underfunding affects the likelihood for defaulting firms with DB plans to file for bankruptcy versus restructure out of court, using logit regressions that control for various pre-default characteristics described in Section 3. In addition to the underfunding dummy constructed in Section 3 (D uf ), we also construct three dummies for deep underfunding. In the four regressions reported in Table 6 that a large fraction of firms have pension underfunding shortly before defaults, regardless of whether the defaults involve bankruptcies or out of court restructurings. These results suggest that pension underfunding is not a significant determinant for restructuring types of defaulting firms with DB plans, although the obligations associated with it increase firms' default probabilities (as shown in Table 3 ). In unreported analyses, we also examine whether the amount or the percentage of pension underfunding affect firms' choice between bankruptcies and out of court restructurings, and find no evidence that such effects exist.
Overall, our results indicate that although bankruptcies (versus out of court restructurings) may be associated with certain benefits for defaulting firms with underfunded pensions (such as the possibility to eliminate pension funding obligations through distress terminations of DB plans), these benefits may be difficult to realize and hence not strong enough to outweigh the increased costs of bankruptcies compared to out of court restructurings.
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Exposures to company stock in DB plans have little relevance to defaulting firms' choices between bankruptcies and out of court restructurings. As shown in Panels C and D of Table 6 , almost all firms with DB plans in our default sample have eliminated such exposures in the year prior to defaults. In sum, results in this section indicate that neither underfunding nor company stock exposures in DB plans constitutes a key determinant for firms' default restructuring types.
Defaulting firms with defined contribution (DC) pension plans
We now turn to exploring the determinants of restructuring types among defaulting firms 17 Terminations of DB plans in bankruptcies can be difficult because the firm needs to prove it can't successfully reorganize if the pensions continue.
with DC plans, with the focus on the plans' exposures to company stock (measured by the fraction of shares outstanding owned by DC plans, denoted by EMPO). Specifically, we test whether company stock exposures in DC plans affect the likelihood for defaulting firms to file for bankruptcies instead of restructure out of court, using logit regressions that control for various pre-default characteristics described in Section 3. We also use the other two company stock exposure measures constructed in Section 3 for exposure levels greater than 1% and 5%, EMPO1 and EMPO5, to examine whether large company stock exposures in DC plans affect defaulting firms' restructuring types. We are interested in this because when employee ownership through DC plans is large, the employees' equity stake can become critical in corporate decisions, in which case the effects of both the motivational and entrenchment views discussed in Section 1 are expected to become stronger. Results of the above regressions are reported in Table 8 .
(Table 8 about Here)
Results in column 1 indicate that increasing company stock exposures in DC plans are associated with higher probabilities for bankruptcy filings instead of out of court restructurings:
the coefficient on EMPO is positive and significant with a z-statistic of 2.11. The positive and significant coefficients on EMPO1 and EMPO5 in columns 2 and 3 show that the above positive effect exists as well when comparing defaulting firms with large company stock exposures in DC plans (greater than 1% or 5%) to other defaulting firms. Overall, our results in Table 8 suggest that increasing company stock exposures in DC plans lead to larger probabilities for defaulting firms to file for bankruptcies instead of restructure out of court, which is consistent with the entrenchment view of employee stock ownership through pension plans.
Conclusion
This paper analyzes the role of corporate pensions in firms' financial distress. We find firms with defined benefit (DB) pension plans reduce these plans' exposures to company stock prior to defaults, avoiding losses from declining stock prices. These firms also lower their contributions to DB plans significantly prior to defaults, increasing underfunding. Reduced company stock exposures and greater underfunding are strongly related to default probabilities.
In contrast, neither the company stock exposures nor underfunding of DB plans is a significant determinant of the restructuring type (bankruptcies versus out of court restructurings). In contrast, exposures to company stock in defined contribution (DC) plans exhibit little variation over time prior to firms' defaults. We calculate that employees incur an average loss of $18 million per firm over the three years before default from their exposures to company stock. Further, company stock exposures in DC plans significantly increase a firm's probability of defaulting and filing for bankruptcy (instead of restructuring out of court), suggesting a link between employee-ownership-related managerial entrenchment and increased default risk.
Our paper is the first in the literature to document the exposures of firms' employees to losses in the event of distress via their pension holdings as well as documenting the outcomes for pension plan participants in a large sample of firms that fail. We fill the gap in the academic literature on the impacts of company stock ownership in pension plans on a firm's likelihood to default and its restructuring process. Our paper sheds lights on whether and how company stock exposures in DB plans affect their underfunding and the combined influences of two factors on default probabilities. Finally, we provide direct evidence to policy makers on the benefits and costs of regulating DB plan underfunding and company stock ownership in DC plans (such as imposing an upper limit).
Table 1 Default frequencies and other characteristics
Panel A considers defaulting firms with and without pension information in the IRS 5500 database and reports the number of defaults, the defaulting firms' assets (in million), sales (in million), and the number of employees on the last reporting date prior to defaults for each year from 1992-2009. Panel B considers defaulting firms with DB and DC plans and reports the number of defaults, the defaulting firms' assets (in million), sales (in million), the number of employees, and the number of employees covered by the pension plans on the last reporting date prior to defaults for each year from 1992-2009.
Panel A: The full default sample
In IRS 5500 Not in IRS 5500 
Table 3 Determinants of defaults for firms with DB plans
This table shows the result from the estimation of a discrete time hazard model for the default probability of firms with DB plans. Standard errors are adjusted as in Shumway (2001) . The sample period is 1992-2009. D uf is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm's DB plans are underfunded and zero otherwise. Underfunding is the pension liabilities minuses the total pension assets (in millions). PCT uf is underfunding divided by total pension assets. EMPO -3 is the fraction of the firm's shares outstanding owned by DB plans in year -3. D EMPO -3 is a dummy equal to 1 if DB plans own company stock in year -3 and zero otherwise. Sales growth is the annual percentage change in sales. Change in EBITDA/sales is the annual percentage change in EBITDA/sales. Leverage is the firm's total liabilities divided by total assets. Return is the firm's cumulative stock return in the past 12 months. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) 
Table 4 Determinants of defaults for firms with DC plans
This table shows the result from the estimation of a discrete time hazard model for the default probability of firms with DC plans. Standard errors are adjusted as in Shumway (2001) . The sample period is 1992-2009. EMPO is the fraction of the firm's shares outstanding owned by DC plans. EMPO1 is the fraction of the firm's shares outstanding owned by DC plans if it is more than 1% and zero otherwise. EMPO5 is the fraction of the firm's shares outstanding owned by DC plans if it is more than 5% and zero otherwise. Sales growth is the annual percentage change in sales. Change in EBITDA/sales is the annual percentage change in EBITDA/sales. Leverage is the firm's total liabilities divided by total assets. Return is the firm's cumulative stock return in the past 12 months. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Table 5 Bankruptcy frequencies and other characteristics
Panel A considers firms filing for bankruptcies with and without pension information in the IRS 5500 database and reports the number of bankruptcies, the bankrupted firms' assets (in million), sales (in million), and the number of employees on the last reporting date prior to defaults for each year from 1992-2009. Panel B considers firms filing for bankruptcies with DB and DC plans and reports the number of bankruptcies, the bankrupted firms' assets (in million), sales (in million), the number of employees, and the number of employees covered by the pension plans on the last reporting date prior to defaults for each year from 1992-2009. Panel C considers firms filing for bankruptcies and having DB plans. Panel D considers firms restructuring out of court and having DB plans. For each of the five years before defaults, this panel reports descriptive statistics for firms' pension information. %UF is the level of DB underfunding divided by plans' total assets. UF is the level of underfunding in millions. EMPO is the company stock in pensions. EMPO (% of shr) is the fractions of the firm's shares outstanding owned by pension plans. EMPO (% of assets) is the fraction of company stock investment in pension assets. Contributions/firm contributions are the firm's contributions to pension plans in millions. Panel E considers firms filing for bankruptcies and having DC plans. Panel F considers firms restructuring out of court and having DC plans. Employee contributions are employees' contributions to pensions in millions. uf is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm's DB plans are underfunded for more than 25% of total plan assets and zero otherwise. Sales growth is the annual percentage change in sales. Change in EBITDA/sales is the annual percentage change in EBITDA/sales. Leverage is the firm's total liabilities divided by total assets. Return is the firm's cumulative stock return in the past 12 months. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) This table shows the result from the estimation of a logit model for the probability of firms with DC plans filing for bankruptcies after defaults. The sample period is 1992-2009. EMPO is the fraction of the firm's shares outstanding owned by DC plans. EMPO1 is the fraction of the firm's shares outstanding owned by DC plans if it is more than 1% and zero otherwise. EMPO5 is the fraction of the firm's shares outstanding owned by DC plans if it is more than 5% and zero otherwise. Sales growth is the annual percentage change in sales. Change in EBITDA/sales is the annual percentage change in EBITDA/sales. Leverage is the firm's total liabilities divided by total assets. Return is the firm's cumulative stock return in the past 12 months. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
